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Introduction
Societal inequalities undermine democracy. That is the main
argument I seek to advance in this book. The country I chose as a
case to demonstrate this relationship is Brazil – one of the most
inequitable countries of the world. Over the last fifteen years I have
spent much time in Brazil and conducted several research projects in
different parts of the country. My work has focused on Brazilian civil
society, education reform, and political participation. Reflecting on
my research on different policy areas, I came to realize that one
theme held them all together, that what I was seeing in different
contexts were different manifestations of the same underlying
pattern. Extreme inequality and the pervasive attempts of historically
included sectors to perpetuate and defend their inherited privilege
seemed to be responsible not only for a civil society that fell short of
its democratizing potential but also for faltering school reform, and
unsuccessful attempts of citizen participation in local governance. An
analysis of the ways and strategies of defending privilege in Brazil
promises to shed light on the social dynamics and causal mechanisms
that impede democratic deepening. As such, my findings on Brazil
are not confined to that country but pose general questions about
societal inequality and democracy that are equally relevant for the
study of democracy elsewhere.
My studies of different aspects of Brazilian democracy revealed
two general insights. The first is that to understand the impacts of
societal inequality on democracy, one must focus on those groups
that benefit from this inequality. The second is that democracy
cannot be adequately understood by focusing exclusively on the
political system. I realized that any treatment of Brazilian democracy
must include an analysis of Brazilian society, in which, after all, the
political system is embedded. This cannot be achieved by simply
including the variable of civil society (as done, e.g. by Linz and
Stepan, 1996) or by focusing on democratic culture (following
Almond and Verba, 1963).1 To capture the shortcomings of
democracy, one must analyze society and focus on the ways the
societal system interacts with and indeed structures the political
system.2
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Although states must be seen as important and partially
autonomous actors, most authors following the path-breaking work
of Evans, Skocpol, and Rueschemeyer (1985) have overestimated the
state’s autonomy and neglected the relationship between autonomous
states and the society in which those states are embedded. Evans,
Skocpol and Rueschemeyer were certainly right to point out that,
“states conceived as organizations claiming control over territories
and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply
reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or
society.”3 But while Brazil’s democracy undoubtedly suffers from
the shortcomings of Brazil’s political system, the gravest
impediments to consolidating democracy are not of a political nature,
but of a social nature. Furthermore, it is not the failing state that
causes Brazil’s democracy to fall short of its promises, but, on the
contrary, Brazil’s extreme societal inequality that permits the
Brazilian state too much autonomy from the will and needs of the
majority population. In short, the extreme inequalities that
characterize Brazilian society are ultimately responsible for its
faltering political regime. Accordingly, my main argument is that a
political system lacks legitimacy if the society in which it is
embedded is extremely unequal. Inequality causes a great part of its
population to be excluded from the active exercise of basic
citizenship and civil rights. The flipside of exclusion is that included
groups have long captured the state and used it to advance their own
goals without feeling, and in effect without effectively being,
accountable to the masses.
In other words, the Brazilian political system is disconnected
from the majority of its population, while a relatively small minority
of Brazilians uses the political system to advance its own ends. In the
words of Teresa Caldeira and James Holston (1998), “The
protections and immunities civil rights are intended to ensure as
constitutional norms are generally perceived and experienced as
privileges of elite social statuses and thus of limited access. They are
not, in other words, appreciated as common rights of citizenship.”4 I
agree with this analysis. In this book, I therefore propose to “bring
society back in.”
Accordingly, this book argues that although Brazil’s political
system is troubled, the division of its society is far more troublesome
and much more consequential, not just at the societal level, but for
the political system as well, because political systems are embedded
in social systems. No matter how minimalist one wants to define
democracy,5 its legitimacy must ultimately reside in a democratic
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society, where the core value of democracy, namely having access to
basic citizenship rights, is guaranteed. A democratic political system
embedded in an undemocratic society is an absurdity and those
accounts that focus their attention exclusively on political systems
are unable to capture the ultimate causes for faltering democratic
regimes. Brazil provides a clear example and therefore an excellent
case for studying the tension that results from a society where civil
rights and liberties are not guaranteed to the majority of Brazilians,
but where the political system continues to function smoothly,
following the rules and procedures laid out for it by the Constitution.
My second insight is that an adequate understanding of Brazilian
democracy and its shortcomings requires a detailed understanding of
the dialectic ways exclusion and inclusion constitute each other and
what mechanisms are used by Brazilians in their everyday lives to
uphold the crucial distinction between who counts as a full citizen
with full access the citizenship rights and who does not. In my
research I found that upholding this distinction is of utmost
importance to the historically privileged and included groups and it is
of far reaching consequences for both sides of this equation because
it provides the critical edge, or the competitive advantage, in the
daily competition for goods in markets characterized by extreme
scarcity. This book, then, pays much attention to the strategies used
by historically included groups to defend their inherited privileges.
My main argument therefore is that it is not inequality per se that
renders Brazilian democracy problematic. It is the constant efforts of
historically included groups to uphold inequality and protect their
privileged access to citizenship rights that casts a deep shadow over
Brazilian democracy.
To understand the dialectic relationship between exclusion and
inclusion, it becomes necessary to step beyond the disciplinary limits
of mainstream political science and integrate the work of other social
sciences. Insights and theoretical frameworks borrowed from history
and sociology have proven especially helpful for this endeavor.
Once a shift of focus toward societal phenomena is undertaken,
another step is necessary. I argue that understanding the impact of
societal inequality on democracy requires another shift of in point of
view, this time away from the excluded and toward the included and
the mechanisms they use to perpetuate their inclusion and the related
exclusion of others. By examining again and again the excluded,
researchers, sociologists and anthropologists in particular, have
contributed to the problematization of the excluded and helped
consolidate the erroneous idea that there is something wrong with the
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poor, the indigenous, blacks, and other historically marginalized
groups.6 Instead of focusing solely on the excluded, we need to pay
more attention to those benefiting from their exclusion. In the
following, I shall propose the concept of “inclusion” for that purpose.
Theorizing Inclusion

In the absence of specific literature on inclusion, the vast literature on
exclusion, inequality, and injustice provides initial insights. Judith
Butler (1998), for example, asks rhetorically, “is it possible to
distinguish, even analytically, between a lack of cultural recognition
and a material oppression, when the very definition of legal
‘personhood’ is rigorously circumscribed by cultural norms that are
indissociable from their material effects?”7 For Butler, the answer is
no. In her essay she explains that the cultural and material are indeed
intimately intertwined. She traces this insight back to Marx’s
German Ideology (1846) and Engels’ Origin of family, private
property, and the state (1884). Marx points to the connection of the
mode of production that produces a certain and corresponding mode
of cooperation and social organization.8
Much of Butler’s critique takes issue with Nancy Fraser’s
distinction between injustices of distribution and injustices of
recognition. Nancy Fraser (1998) argues that both kinds of injustices
are equally serious, but that they operate differently. For Fraser, to be
misrecognized means “to be denied the status of a full partner in
social interaction and prevented from participating as a peer in social
life – not as a consequence of a distributive inequity (such as failing
to receive one’s fair share of resources or ‘primary goods’), but
rather as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of interpretation
and evaluation that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of
respect or esteem.”9 Accordingly, Fraser defines misrecognition as an
“institutionalized social relation, not a psychological state.”10 Fraser
also points to the connection she makes between the symbolic and
the material. For her, “The norms, significations, and constructions
of personhood that impede women, racialized peoples, and/or gays
and lesbians from parity of participation in social life are materially
instantiated – in institutions and social practices, in social action and
embodied habitus, and yes, in ideological state apparatuses. Far from
occupying some wispy, ethereal realm, they are material in their
existence and effects.”11
However the material and cultural relate, this discussion clearly
demonstrates that exclusion has two dimensions and it necessary
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follows that inclusion is equally constituted by material and symbolic
or cultural variables. Among the symbolic variables, whiteness is
extremely consequential. Whiteness, anything but a biological
reality, is used as a symbolical indicator of civilizing potential.12
Lesser (1999) demonstrated that what it meant to be “white” shifted
in Brazil between 1850 and 1950, but whiteness remained a cultural
category, signifying superiority and well-deserved privilege.
Brazilian elites openly discussed and compared the different degrees
of whiteness of such potential immigrants as Arabs, Japanese, and
Southern Europeans, associating whiteness with aptitude.13 The idea
of whiteness was therefore constructed and used as a form of capital,
strongly associated with merit and progressive, developmental
potential.
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of distinction
provides an entrance point for conceptualizing whiteness as a highly
effective form of capital, functioning in a social space that is
constituted in relation to other social positions, where each one uses
the other for reference. Although Bourdieu ignores ethnicity and race
in his theory, his thoughts on gender point to a direction that allows
further development. He argues that, “the volume and composition of
capital give specific form and value to the determinations which the
other factors (age, sex, place of residence etc.) impose on practices.
Sexual properties are as inseparable from class practices as the
yellowness of a lemon is from its acidity: a class is defined in an
essential respect by the place and value it gives to the sexes and to
their socially constituted dispositions.”14
In a similar way, whiteness constitutes capital in addition to the
other types of capital, namely financial, social, and cultural. Their
importance, however, does not follow a simple additive logic. One
type of capital rather connects to the others and together they
determine the social place an individual will hold in a society. This
allows for some flexibility, as one form of capital can be used to
partly compensate for the lack of another, although this flexibility is
limited precisely by the lumped condition of the different capitals. In
that way, as Bourdieu points out correctly, each single form of
capital tends to over-determine the social position of its carrier, as the
presence or absence of each single one is perceived as being
indicative of the presence or absence of the others. It is in this sense
that whiteness over-determines its carrier, bestowing him with a
social position that might not be warranted. In other words, because
of the composite character of the different forms of capital, whiteness
signals the presence of other forms, even though they might not be
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present. Blackness, at the same time, signifies the absence of other
types of capital and equally over-determines its carrier.
The resulting social position then becomes a social expectation
and reflects back on the carrying individual. In Bourdieu’s own
words, “the homogeneity of the disposition associated with a position
and their seemingly miraculous adjustment to the demands inscribed
in it result partly from the mechanisms which channel towards
positions individuals who are already adjusted to them, either
because they feel ‘made’ for jobs that are ‘made’ for them (…) or
because they are seen in this light by the occupants of the posts (…)
and partly from the dialectic which is established, throughout a
lifetime, between dispositions and positions, aspirations and
achievements.”15 In other words, individuals tend to conform to the
social positions they hold and to internalize the role expectations
associated with these positions.
In sum, what matters is not the objective position an individual
holds in the social space, but the subjective experience of living with
and through this position and rather having to uphold and defend it in
daily interactions, or trying to change or mask it in order to escape
the negative effects resulting from potential over-determination.
Defending or challenging one’s social place therefore is a daily
struggle and bears very tangible consequences for one’s capabilities
to live life. Given its relational character, maintaining one’s own
inclusion requires maintaining the exclusion of others.16
In order to reproduce a social structure that secures privileges
and advantages to one group and denies it to others, the maintenance
of the border that marks inclusion and separates it from exclusion
becomes extremely important. It comes to no surprise that Brazilian
daily life is full of symbolic acts that fulfill this border-maintenance
function. This is even more the case where racial capital is not
clearly demarcated and therefore illusive for providing clear borders
of belonging.
Some Words on Methodology

Although I use statistical data, my main intention in this book is to
better understand how and why inequality impacts democracy.
Quantitative methods do not suffice to answer these questions,
mainly because of their weakness in determining causality. The
research method most suited for answering my questions regarding
the relationship between inequality and democracy in Brazil, in my
judgment, is the case study. By using a case study approach, I
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broadly follow Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) who
define the case study approach as “the detailed examination of an
aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical
explanations that may be generalizable to other events.”17
Within the broader field of case study analysis, process tracing is
one of the most valuable tools. Process tracing “attempts to identify
the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal
mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the
outcome of the dependent variable.”18 Especially important in this
method is the process tracing of deviant cases, extreme cases, most
likely, and least likely cases. Process tracing can help to identify the
chain of events that led to a certain outcome. By focusing on extreme
cases, this method allows for an assessment of the most salient
causes at work. By including deviant cases, it also allows for an
assessment of the necessary or sufficient contribution of a causal
variable in a certain outcome. Deviance can be caused by a
previously overlooked variable. A deviant case might also lead to the
specification of a theory.
I thus selected cases that I find particularly problematic and
therefore especially telling, and this book focuses on some of the
most extreme cases in which included Brazilians actively engage in
defending their inherited privileged positions in social hierarchies.
The causes and perceptions of urban violence are amongst the most
telling in this respect, as violence has become a way to interpret
Brazil and the interpretations of the causes for violence provide
evidence for the worldview of the included. Another very telling case
that allows for an analysis of the ways inclusions and exclusion
constitute each other is provided by focusing on the daily interactions
between maids and their employers. The employment of maids is
very widespread in Brazil and it allows us to draw important
conclusions about the mechanisms used by employers to constitute
and justify their superiority over their employees. The very endemic
persistence of clientelism and corruption in Brazilian politics raises
important questions and an analysis of the underlying causes for this
persistence promises to shed light on the ways state employment is
used to perpetuate inclusion and to defend privilege. To better
understand this endemic Brazilian problem, one needs to examine the
history of how Brazilian elites have captured and used the state to
perpetuate their own privilege.
But although these general treatments of Brazilian reality are
extremely revealing and tell us much about how historically included
groups operate to perpetuate their inclusion and to justify their
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privilege, a true understanding of the causes and workings of
defending privilege and upholding exclusion needs to zoom in even
further and analyze the interactions between the included and the
excluded in concrete and historically determined situations. To
achieve this goal, this book presents case studies on education and
political participation from one Brazilian city, Salvador. Salvador
was chosen because it offered the richest and most promising
environment for my analysis. Salvador is one of the poorest and most
inequitable state capitals in Brazil, thus it provides us with a starker
than average view of the mechanisms used to defend privilege. In
addition, Salvador’s population includes an above average
percentage of black citizens, which provides us with the opportunity
to examine the racialized character of upholding privilege with more
clarity. Thus, Salvador represents an extreme case that elucidates the
general functioning of defending privilege in Brazil and elsewhere,
and the cases from Salvador allow us to gain a deeper understanding
of the causes and mechanisms employed by the historically included
to defend their privileged positions in social hierarchies. Salvador,
then, constitutes an idealtype for the constitution of inclusion and
exclusion and for the racialized nature of this process, but it is not an
exception. The exclusion from the full exercise of citizenship rights
and the role that education and the abuse of state power play in
achieving this exclusion is characteristic of the whole country. The
examples I am able to present in this book are intended to highlight
some of the mechanisms used to achieve this exclusion. Adding more
cases from different regions or even countries will not alter the logic
I seek to unveil.
Definitions

My hypothesis that social inequalities cause Brazilian democracy to
fall short of its promises immediately necessitates clarification of the
two central concepts involved in the argument, namely “social
inequality” and “democracy.” I rely on probably the most recognized
voice in the field for the definition of social inequality. Amartya Sen
(1992 and 1999) has proposed a “capability approach” to assessing
inequality. According to Sen (1992), “capability is, thus, a set of
vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one
type of life or another. (…) This freedom, reflecting a person’s
opportunities of well-being must be valued at least for instrumental
[italics in original] reasons, e.g. in judging how good a ‘deal’ a
person has in the society. But in addition (…) freedom may be seen
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as being intrinsically important for a good social structure.”19 Sen
proposes a new foundation for the study of individual behavior, away
from individual utilities and toward individual capabilities.
Analyzing individuals as having a certain range of capability of
choice and action brings the focus to enlarge these capabilities in
order to get a more aggregated welfare function. In other words, it is
Sen’s insight that investing in an individual’s capabilities through
spending in her education and health also has a positive effect on
markets, as these freedoms will very likely be used to produce and
trade. At the same time, Sen gets rid of the predominant approach of
treating self-interested action as the necessary and sufficient basis to
produce Pareto optimality. If freedom to “choose what one has good
reason to choose” becomes the basic assumption and replaces
individual utility, then there is no reason to assume that profit
maximizing is the only motive available to guide - and analyze human action. This treatment offers several advantages, but most
importantly it highlights the criterion of the ability of individuals to
choose the kind of life they themselves deem valuable. This approach
is especially relevant for the analysis of countries with a colonial
background, as we shall see later.20
Throughout his book, I provide several empirical examples of
Brazilians with very unequal capabilities of living the kind of life
they deem worth living and even of having a say in the collective
decisions that impact their lives. The unequal distribution of the
capability to live the life one values has not only important direct
consequences on the democratic system. It also has important social
consequences that impact democracy, as we shall see.
Defining the concept of “democracy” is more complicated and
requires some more elaboration in order to justify the choice of one
definition over another. I find the most useful framework to be
Jürgen Habermas’ (1998) conceptualization of discursive democracy.
His theoretical framework allows for the formulation of a coherent
set of assumptions and hypotheses about democracy, democratic
legitimacy, and the public sphere that I find helpful in assessing
democracy’s quality.
Habermas’ model of discursive democracy operates in a space
in-between normative models of democracy and sociological theories
of society. That is it takes both the state and the society into account.
From this perspective, inequality, misrecognition, and oppression are
negatively related to democratic governance and they condition the
very possibility of a democratic regime. According to Habermas,
“only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the
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confines of class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social
stratification and exploitation can the potential of an unleashed
cultural pluralism fully develop.”21
This model of democracy is located in between traditional
republican and liberal conceptions. From the republican view, it
borrows the conception that democratic legitimacy ultimately rests
on public will-formation. Against such communitarian approaches
provided by Benjamin Barber (1985) or Michael Sandel (1996), it
argues that participation in public affairs is not dependent on the
cultivation of virtue, nor is it the citizens’ highest duty to participate
in public affairs. In addition to the problems of feasibility that
necessarily arise from republican conceptions of democracy in
modern societies with millions of inhabitants, republican models of
democracy also require substantive definitions of the public good,
but what constitutes “the public good” has remained problematic. A
discursive model of democracy argues that substantive definitions of
the public good are desirable, but not fixed. They are instead open to
review, because they are historically determined, and society must
constantly engage in public deliberation about such substantive
definitions.
Habermas finds that modern societies are too big, too decentered,
and too multi-cultural to constitute homogeneous public spheres
where all citizens can and must participate, and thus rejects most
communitarian models and those classical republican conceptions of
democracy that take their inspiration from Aristotle and the Greek
polis. Deliberation, instead, occurs in several spheres, at several
levels of institutionalized and non-institutionalized society, inside
and outside the state. Republican views become less and less
applicable as societies grow more diverse and multicultural and the
drawing of borders of community necessarily excludes certain groups
from a solidarity defined in ethnic or national terms.
Unlike the classical liberal conception of democracy, a discursive
model of democracy recognizes the need for active citizen
participation in democratic governance and remains skeptical of the
idea that conflict and negotiations between private interests
unfettered by government automatically produces public goods. It
also takes issue with the liberal neutrality of the state towards
different conceptions of the public good. From a deliberative
perspective, it is not enough to ensure that everybody plays by the
rules as certain substantive values of secular, modern societies are
likely to come under attack by anti-democratic groups that play by
the rules and use them to undermine the very basis on which modern,

Introduction 11

secular societies stand. In Habermas’ own words, “the discourse
theory of democracy corresponds to the image of a decentered
society, albeit a society in which the political public sphere has been
differentiated as an arena for the perception, identification, and
treatment of problems affecting the whole society.”22
According to Habermas, it is through “mobilizing citizen’s
communicative freedom for the formation of political beliefs”23 that
the democratically achieved common will can be created upon which
legitimate state power must ultimately rest. Habermas further argues
that, “the success of deliberative politics depends not on a
collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the
corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as well
as on the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with
informally developed public opinions.”24 Seyla Benhabib (1996), in
turn, explains that such deliberative models of democracy share a
model of “plurality of modes of association in which all affected can
have the right to articulate their point of view. These can range from
political parties, to citizens’ initiatives, to social movements, to
voluntary associations, to consciousness-raising groups, and the
like.”25 For Benhabib, deliberative processes should happen in all
these different forms of associations, allowing for an “interlocking”
and the creation of “networks” of spaces for deliberative reasoning.
She argues that “legitimacy in complex democratic societies must be
thought to result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation
of all about matters of common concern.”26 This definition comes
closest to the model Cohen and Rogers (1995) have called
“egalitarian pluralism,” understood as a set of institutional designs
allowing for secondary associations to influence legislative and
administrative arenas.
Critics have argued that deliberations can easily be distorted and
manipulated. But instead of undermining this approach, this critique
rather points to the reasons why so many contemporary democracies
are lacking in quality. Democracy, after all, cannot develop its full
potential in societies that are characterized by extreme inequalities,
powerful authorities that are able to manipulate or intimidate others,
or traditions or religions that, prohibit discussion of particular topics
or define certain norms as “God-given” and out of the realm of
public deliberation. A discursive conception of democracy helps us
see why most democracies are weak and why political processes are
oftentimes distorted, leading to inequitable outcomes.
As stated above, no matter how minimalist one’s definition of
democracy, democratic legitimacy must ultimately rest on public

12

Negotiating Democracy in Brazil

consent and democratic government must be embedded in a
democratic society for this consent to form without excluding
significant parts of the citizenry. A collective will must be achieved
discursively and behavioral and moral standards must be formed,
consolidated, and become institutionalized in the form of legal
standards, as Emile Durkheim demonstrated in the late 19th century.27
Democratic legitimacy therefore must rest on a democratic public
sphere that is open to all citizens, where the public sphere is
understood as an open (public) domain of political will formation
and discussion.
By elevating the public sphere into the spotlight of democratic
legitimacy, the discursive conception of democracy meets Amartya
Sen’s capability approach. According to Sen, in a democracy all
citizens must have equal access to appear in the public sphere
without shame and be able to influence it. This basic insight remains
unchallenged by the fact that historically, most, if not all, public
spheres in the West have remained exclusive and reserved to white
males. It is also not invalidated by the fact that in most cases, a
plurality of public spheres exists, competing with each other. To the
contrary, these caveats allow us to understand why democracy has
fallen short of its possibilities in so many places. Habermas and Sen
thus point us to the variables we have to analyze if we are interested
in the study of democracy.
Chapter Overview

Chapter Two presents a very brief diagnosis of Brazilian democracy
and its shortcomings. I propose that the main problem of Brazilian
democracy is its inability to represent its weakest elements.
Democratic legitimacy, in Brazil, does not rest on the entire
population, but on a minority, and access to civil rights in Brazil is a
privilege rather than a right. Behind this shortcoming lies the
absolute division of Brazilian society into included and excluded
groups.
Chapter Three elaborates the historical roots of inclusion in
Brazil. Going back to the early 19th century, I demonstrate how a
white minority was able to transform itself into the norm and render
the black and indigenous majority into exotic others in their own
country. This chapter ends with an analysis of how political elites
were able to avoid a radical re-structuring of Brazilian society and
thereby perpetuate their own privileges positions in the societal
hierarchies.
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Chapter Four presents research conducted between 2001 and
2005 in Salvador, Bahia on inequality and education. Through a
comparison of public and private middle and high schools I
demonstrate that public schools, even after a state-wide reform effort
initiated in 1999, provide poor education for the poor, whereas
private schools prepare the offspring of the historically privileged for
their brilliant futures.
Chapter Five addresses the domestication of the excluded and
demonstrates how the dichotomy of inclusion / exclusion is
reproduced daily within the households of included Brazilians
through the very widespread practice of employing domestic
servants. I demonstrate that the domestication of the excluded
constitutes the superiority of the included and that employing
domestic servants is not a pre-modern practice, but part of Brazilian
modernity.
Chapter Six, presents and discusses research conducted in 2001,
an analysis of Bahian NGOs. Although civil society has the potential
to create independent, democratic, and counter-hegemonic public
spaces, I find that the NGOs in my sample did not live up to that
possibility and instead reproduced the same paternalistic and racist
practices that characterize the broader society.
Chapter Seven presents the findings of my research on popular
participation in school management, participatory budgeting, and
participatory planning, conducted in 2005 and 2006. Although
several Brazilian cities created mechanisms to channel popular
participation in various policy areas, I find that the deep societal
inequalities and the division of Brazilian society into two factions
ultimately render meaningful popular participation in any policymaking impossible.
Chapter Eight presents a historical analysis of the Brazilian
“political class.” It traces the elite domination of the Brazilian state
and its appropriation and indeed privatization by the historically
included back to a tradition of “bacharelismo” – a Luso-Brazilian
tradition responsible for creating a sense of superiority and lack of
commitment and accountability among state officials and elected
representatives. Bacharelism provides an important background for
understanding the connection between personalistic leadership styles
and the state apparatus. It also provides the background for the
discussion of the limits of popular participation presented in chapter
nine.
In Chapter Nine I recapitulate the main findings and conclusions
reached throughout this book.
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1
My approach also goes beyond the recent re-focusing on civil society to
hold governments accountable, as proposed by Peruzzotti and Smulovitz
(2006). Although I agree with Avritzer (2002) that democratic innovation must
originate from the societal level, I am much less optimistic about the degree to
which such innovation characterizes Brazilian society. In my opinion, it is
sobering to realize that most accounts of innovative social practices rely on the
cases of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, and the fact that Participatory
Budgeting came to an end in Porto Alegre in 2004 further adds to my
skepticism.
2
In their treatment of Brazilian democracy, authors like Diamond (1999),
Linz and Stepan (1996), Hagopian (2000), and Mainwaring (1995 and 1997)
typically point to a weak party system and problems resulting from an unstable
balance between parliamentary and presidential systems as the causes for
unfinished consolidation in Brazil. Although this approach has improved our
understanding of the importance of institutional settings to achieve certain
outcomes, such analyses must remain unsatisfactory. The debate over which
political institutional settings are more likely to improve the functioning of
democratic systems runs the risk of confounding means with ends, because
although institutions are important to provide incentives and channel
expectations, they cannot guarantee a desired outcome, as recently pointed out
by Avritzer (2002).
3
Evans et.al. Skocpol 1985:9.
4
Caldeira and Holston 1998:276, in Aguero and Stark (eds.).
5
E.g. following Joseph Schumpeter in his minimalist treatment of
democracy, where political elites compete for votes in regular and fair
elections.
6
To be exact, by focusing on the excluded, social scientists involuntarily
help the included to escape analysis and they are at risk of becoming functional
in the ongoing process of consolidating the idea that blacks, indigenous groups,
women, homosexuals, and the poor are “Others,” whereas they, the included,
represent the norm. In my own empirical research I consistently found nothing
to be wrong with the excluded and a lot to be wrong with the included. A shift
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5
The Domestication of the Excluded
For inequalities to be maintained, they need to be anchored in the
minds of the excluded and the included alike. This chapter argues
that it is in the private and intimate spheres, inside Brazilian homes,
that the distinction between the included and the excluded, between
those that have rights and those that depend on favors, is planted in
minds of the participating individuals and also in the collective
consciousness. The household constitutes a central place for the
normalizing and institutionalizing of unjust orders, because it is in
our homes and the homes of others that we become accustomed to
social realities, thus elevating our everyday reality to the status of
common sense.
In order to structure the perception of reality, social hierarchies
must be rendered unproblematic, so that they appear normal. They
need to be “normalized” and elevated into our taken-for-granted
stock of interpretative patterns about the world, our common sense.
Gramsci (1999) explained that common sense is characterized by
uncritically taken-for-granted beliefs that reflect dominant interests
and that thus serve to maintain hegemonic control. What passes for
common sense is indeed historically constructed and its content is a
reflection of prevalent power structures. Not any reality can become
common sense, but only those that find enough support and
acceptance. Once accepted, common sense appears as unproblematic,
normal, and the way things have always been and indeed how they
must be. In the words of Stuart Hall, “common sense does not
require reasoning, argument, logic, thought: it is spontaneously
available, thoroughly recognizable, widely shared (…) It is precisely
its ‘spontaneous’ quality, its transparency, its ‘naturalness,’ its
refusal to be made to examine the premises on which it is founded,
its resistance to change or to correction, its effect of instant
recognition, and the closed circle in which it moves which makes
common sense, at one and the same time, ‘spontaneous,’ ideological
and unconscious.1
In other words, once normalized, oppression is no longer visible
and thus becomes difficult to change. Gramsci introduced the
concept of “cultural hegemony” to refer to the ability of societal
fractions who benefit from an unjust order and have enough power to
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elevate this order to “the reality” of all the people sharing one system
of reference. Current orders and widely accepted “ways how things
are” disguise their historically constructed character and the powerful
interests that have brought this order into being. Nevertheless, these
orders need to be constructed and reproduced in daily interaction so
that they remain part of common sense.
Norbert Elias (1978) has shown how the exercise of power and
distinction in everyday relationships constitutes and reinforces the
separation of social groups. Among the central places where social
hierarchies and oppression are normalized and anchored in the
Brazilian common sense are the private spheres, where included
groups reproduce a framework of inequality in their daily interaction
with excluded groups. Inside the houses of the included, in their
routinized interaction with their subordinates, the skewed
frameworks of who counts as included and who doesn’t, as well as
the related dichotomy of who has rights and who doesn’t, are played
out on a daily basis.
Domestics

In Brazil, the employment of maids is a widespread practice, making
it the norm among included Brazilians. A survey conducted by
Datafolha, a renowned Brazilian research institute, discovered that,
in 2002, domestic service employed some five million. This survey
also found that 21 percent of all employed females work in the
domestic service sector, making it the most important female
employment sector in Brazil. This number appears to have changed
little over time; in 1989, Chaney and Castro found that in Latin
America and the Caribbean, no less than 20 percent of the female
work force worked as maids. The Datafolha survey found that of
women employed in the domestic service sector, 37 percent were
brown and 24 percent black. In an assessment of domestic
employment in Rio de Janeiro, Pereira (in Chaney and Castro, 1989)
found that over half of Rio’s domestic workers earn from nothing to
one-half of a minimum wage and that 79.5 percent work longer than
the legally regulated 40 hours per week.
Sherriff (1997), who conducted several years of field research in
the Rio de Janeiro favela Morro do Sangue Bom, stated that she did
not encounter one single woman who had not worked as a maid in a
middle class home during some period in her life. Sheriff explains
that, “a girl may begin her first full-time job at the age of fourteen or
fifteen. Many of the women I knew had spent at least a part of their
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adolescence as ‘live-in’ maids, i.e. they lived with their employer
families and went home only on weekends or Sundays.” 2
Rollins (1985) traces the origins of domestic work back to
domestic slavery. Comparing several countries in historical analysis,
she points to the fact that industrial revolutions led to a pull and push
effect, pushing the rural poor into industrializing cities where a new
middle-class emerged, able to afford domestic servants. In Brazil,
high rates of urban unemployment nurtured by rural migration and
industrialization allowed for an expansion of the urban middleclasses starting in the 1940s. Taking advantage of the huge numbers
of unemployed, domestic labor in middle and upper class households
expanded to become the country’s most important female
employment activity.3 The poverty and high illiteracy that
particularly affect Afro-Brazilians leave many excluded with only
very few options. With other employment opportunities in short
supply, and confronted by the fact that regular unskilled work offers
merely a low salary and not food and lodging, as domestic service
often does, many excluded women are pushed into domestic service.
Describing the work-relationship and the rituals created within it,
Rollins points to the extreme inequalities that characterize this job,
along with the vulnerability produced by a lack of co-workers, total
dependency on the employer, and the isolating character of this work.
As domestic work has very low prestige, employers take pains to
distance themselves from their servants, using several symbolic
mechanisms to stress this distance. Upholding the invention of racial
inferiority is one of the most salient strategies to maintain the
distance between employer and maid.
Kofes (2001), studying the relationship between domestic
servants and their employers in São Paulo, calls attention to the
vocabulary commonly used in this sphere, where the employee is
habitually referred to as doméstica (domestic) and the employer as
patroa (patron). In her ethnographic material Kofes shows how being
a domestic in a Brazilian household implies being constantly
“domesticated,” stereotyped, and abused. In a similar way, Twine
(1997), during her ethnographic research, found Brazilian servants
being treated as children even if they were adults. Twine
demonstrates that such infantilization goes hand in hand with the
creation of paternalistic dependencies, as maids are oftentimes not
even paid the minimum wage but are instead offered a bedroom,
food, and other material compensation.
Gill (1994), in turn, points at the gender dynamics of the patron –
domestic relationship. Studying Bolivian female domestic workers,
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she concludes that it is mostly female employers who exploit female
servants, justifying their behavior through the invention of the
“inferiority” and racial otherness of the maid. Gill also highlights the
extreme vulnerability of female domestics, especially the ones that
live-in, as they are extremely dependent on their employers.
According to Gill, sexual abuse is frequent and is part of the way
upper- and middle-class women, who typically define themselves as
“white” and construct their own identities by setting themselves apart
from the “low moral standards” of the racialized other. Gill further
argues that male employers’ predatory behavior and abuse towards
servants is oftentimes tolerated or ignored, as long as such relations
do not lead to entitlements for the servants.4
Focusing on the situation of domestic workers in Latin America
and the Caribbean in general, Chaney and Castro (1989) find
similarities among the several countries they study. They argue that
wherever it is practiced, domestic employment is an underpaid and
depreciated activity. Most of the time, maids migrate to their
workplaces, coming from the countryside or from other regions or
countries. They also find that in Latin America and the Caribbean
most maids have a different ethnic background than their employers,
an ethnicity their employers consider “inferior.” Most maids work
alone, which further enhances their vulnerability and increases the
chances of falling victim to physical and emotional abuse. The
authors conclude that, “domestic workers in most countries remain
among the most oppressed and neglected sector of the working
class.”5
Even in countries like the United States, where maids find more
support structures and a more effective legal systems than those in
most Latin American countries, Colen (in Chaney and Castro 1989)
finds US employers using similar techniques to dehumanize their
maids. These include not allowing them to share the same table and
the same food with their employers, nor the same bathrooms, toilets,
or even seats. In addition, most employers address their maids by the
first name or refer to them as “the girl,” even if they are grown
adults.6 All these techniques contribute to widen the gap between the
employer and the employed, based on a constant and systematic
infantilization and ultimately dehumanization of the domestic
worker.
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Domestication

Although analyses taking the maid’s perspective into account are
rare, the autobiography of a Peruvian domestic worker and activist
Adelinda Diaz Uriarte provides some important insights.7 The
available literature on domestic service allows for the conclusion that
Uriarte’s experiences are typical and characterize the general ways
domestics are treated by their patrons. Uriarte describes the
techniques her employers used to hold her in a slavery-like
dependency. Starting out as a child and cut-off from potential support
structures, her situation resembled the ones described by Bales
(2000) in his analysis of contemporary slavery.8 Her total isolation,
together with the creation of absolute dependency and the constant
physical and emotional abuse do not fall very short of the situation
African slaves had to endure in colonial times.9
Very similar stories are told by Brazilian domestics in the
September 2002 edition of the UN feminist journal Maria Maria,
dedicated to domestic workers.10 According to Branca Maria Alves’
editorial, “five million Brazilian women work as domestic servants.
Some sleep at their workplace, having infinite workdays. Others - the
majority - live infinitely far from their workplace. Many are single
mothers and they do the possible and the impossible, the imaginable
and the unimaginable to sustain their children. (…) This is an
extremely de-valorized activity: many do not even earn a minimum
wage and only 24 percent have a work contract.”11
The testimony of domestic servants, reproduced in Maria Maria,
provides ample evidence of the constant de-humanization resulting
from the extreme power disequilibrium that characterizes this
profession. Maria José Moreno Ruiz, for example, a 32 year old
Chilean domestic servant working for the same family for twelve
years, ponders about what would happen if she were to die
tomorrow:
If I were to die tomorrow, Mister Julio would immediately be
annoyed. When he arrived at home at night, nobody would have laid
out three different shirts on his bed for his choice. The Mistress would
also be affected. Nobody would place, at exactly 6 pm, the aromatic
stones next to her bathtub for her well-deserved bath after coming
home from work. Can it be that my friends and I do not deserve this as
well? The children, little George and Inez, would feel it the most,
because they do not have many people to hug them, listen to their
stories and show interest in their daily routines, dedicating time to
them with selflessness and professionalism. The next week would be
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different. The inconvenient body would have been removed and with it
the memories of death. An acquaintance or a friend would have
already recommended some “girl” (they would not call her a woman,
even if she were 60 years old and could only move her soul) to cook,
iron, clean, keep silence, embrace, get up before daybreak, stay up
without sleep. Better even if she had no children, “because these days
families that have domestic servants already make a big enough effort
to give them work and cannot afford any extra expenses.” They can
also not study, because that would limit the work hours. She should
attend like a servant, smiling softly and submissively. Obviously, if
Mister Julio or even the Mistress would die tomorrow, they would
have much marble on their tombs and they would have paid a priest to
commemorate the funeral and they would reserve a beautiful place at
the cemetery. But among the dead there are many that never thought
that they would be replaceable, that the fucked up world of theirs, so
important and cryptic, would continue without them. I doubt that
someone would comment, during the final minutes of Mister Julio or
the Mistress, that they were not very human toward their domestic
servants. I do not only want bread and Sundays off. I also want
dreams, love, autonomy, power, beauty, theater, aromatherapy,
caressing, sex, respect, and a future.12

A Bahian maid, 23 years old, describes the powerlessness
experienced when working as a domestic servant and points out some
of the typical mechanisms used by patroas (female employers,
literally “patrons”) to control and infantilize their maids:
The first years were very difficult and it still is. I worked in four
houses and the best patroa I had moved to Curitiba. After that I only
worked in bad houses. There was one patroa who made my plate, I
could not serve myself, and I had to stay quiet when her grandson was
hitting me. Another one only paid 100 Reais because I lived in her
house. Where else could I live? Now I am working for a couple and
his mother. The two apartments are very big and I get very tired. I
work everyday in one of the houses and I earn 350 Reais [minimum
wage at the time-- the author] together, from both patroas.13

The life stories collected in Maria Maria, as well as the
testimony of Adelinda Diaz Uriarte, all express similar sentiments of
isolation, abuse, de-humanization, and rage. They all point to the
dialectic relationship that welds together the domesticated and their
domesticator. As pointed out by Hegel much earlier, one constitutes
the other and the weakness to which the domesticated is condemned
provides the source of strength for the domesticator. At the same
time, most statements given by maids also testify to the unstable
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nature of this relationship. Although constantly told that they belong
to the family, they do not believe such bedazzlement and most maids
recognize that their employers are also their oppressors. The words
of Maria Ruiz are again typical: “Again, I spoke with more rage than
resignation: In a world that unjust, the maid even gets used to
walking around with her head down if they ask her to.” At the same
time that they are employed and earn money, the social conventions
and abuse that customarily accompanies this work transforms it into
one of the key societal institutions responsible for upholding
inequality and for the mutual constitution of inclusion and exclusion.
Rights and Favors

Paternalism negates autonomy and undermines the very possibility of
democracy. According to Kant, it is “the greatest despotism
imaginable.”14 When a patron hires a domestic, she takes away the
domestic’s voice and reduces her to the status of a child. This
degradation finds expression in the infantilization described above by
Maria Ruiz and analyzed in more detail by Twine (1997). Calling an
adult employee a “girl” reduces her to the legal status of a minor and
robs her of the status of being an autonomous person that knows best
what is good for her. By reducing an adult to a child’s status, patrons
not only rob domestics of their autonomy; they also elevate
themselves above their clients and make decisions for them,
oftentimes justifying such action by stating that, “they don’t know
what is best for them.” If such paternalistic structures become
successfully institutionalized, they channel further expectations and
actions on both sides. Patrons “really believe” that they know best
what is good for their maids and decide for them; and domestics
accept “the fact” that they do not know what is good for themselves
and that their patrons know better. What plays itself out as an adult –
child relationship in the private sphere translates into a differentiation
between those that have rights, based on their perceived autonomy,
and those that do not have rights, because of their child-like status
and lack of autonomy.
To further instill a sense of inferiority into their maids and to
elevate themselves into the position of caring patrons, patrons
oftentimes give presents and goods to their maids and help them with
small favors, expecting loyalty in return. At the same time that a
maid has no access to rights, she is required to be thankful for the
“favors” bestowed on her by her patron. This institution is at the
heart of constituting paternalist power structures and it is also one of
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the core mechanisms used to differentiate between those who have
rights and those that depend on favors and must demonstrate
deference in return. A commonly used framework to create such a
structure is to tell maids that they “almost belong to the family.” The
Bahian maid quoted above provides an example:
Sometimes I think that I am exploited and enslaved, but there is
nothing I can do about it. They always say that I almost belong to the
family, but I don’t believe it. Patroas mostly say that when we ask to
settle the bills. They are scared of ending up without a maid. But I
know that I do not belong to the family, because if I did, I could sit
down with them at the same table and I could enter the house through
the front door. Whenever they say that, I just pretend I am listening.15

At the same time that the rights of maids are reduced to those of
a minor, the very constitution of the rights of their patrons depends
on this negation of rights; domestic service must thus be understood
not just as a mechanism to exploit and control the poor. Even more
importantly, at least within the context of the discussions advanced in
this book, domestic service constitutes a central place for the
construction of inclusion. Maids free their mostly female patrons
from domesticating housework and enable them to act as full citizens
and professionals in the public sphere. The following statement of a
34-year-old São Paulo female professional provides some hints at
this mutual constitution of having rights and depending on favors:
I work in three shifts. I am the principal of a kindergarten, I attend
cases of clinical psychology in my private clinic, and I am active at the
Nonprofit Center “It’s the Law,” dedicated to AIDS / STD prevention
and treatment of drug abuse. I don’t have the slightest possibility of
coming home at midnight and start washing, cooking, cleaning, and
ironing…16

In a society where domestic work is relegated almost by default
to females and males are not even included in the equation of
household duties, professional included women free themselves from
the domestication inherent in domestic work by shifting it over to
other women. This shift not only reinforces the existing differences
between included and excluded women, it actually aids in the
constitution and consolidation of it. Racism plays a core role in this
mutual constitution of inclusion and exclusion, as we shall see.
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Racism

Sheriff’s (1997) ethnographic work among Rio de Janeiro favela
dwellers reveals the racism inherent in the patron-servant
relationship. In a typical, yet very telling statement, one of her
informants, who works as a maid in the home of a French woman,
tells the researcher that her employer is not racist, because she “even
drinks from the same glass.”17 Statements like these point to the high
degree to which exclusion and oppression have been internalized by
the oppressed. Another informant explains that the building has two
separate entrances, one for the white middle-class dweller, and one
for the mostly black service personnel. She explains that, “if you are
black (pretinho) you have to go up in the service elevator, but if
you’re white like you, they let you go the other way. It’s like that
almost everywhere.”18
Several of Sheriff’s informants gave evidence of the prevalence
of racial stereotyping, referring to blacks as being dirty and smelling
bad. One informant, herself a maid, explained that white middle-class
families preferred lighter skin maids, especially for childcare. Dark
complexion blacks could only find cleaning and cooking jobs.19
Sheriff highlights the fear many white middle-class patrons have of
racial contamination and “pollution” from contact with their black
maids. She concludes: “In describing the racialized nature of many
everyday encounters, in framing such encounters as examples of
boundary-maintaining incidents that occur ‘all the time,’ and in
accounting for racism in the language of a structured and structuring
hegemony, my informants reveal what is ‘embaixo do pano’ or under
the concealing fabric of the dominant narrative of race (and silence
about racism) in Brazil.”20
Modernity

In Rio de Janeiro, as in any other Brazilian city, almost all modern
high-rise apartment buildings have two separate entrances and
domestics have to use the service elevator, even if they are in street
clothes. Sheriff finds that “nearly all of the older and larger middleclass apartments and houses in Rio have very small rooms with a tiny
bathroom attached, usually located next to the kitchen.”21 In Sheriff’s
evaluation, having these small maid rooms “is still considered a
standard appurtenance in middle-class dwellings.”22 It also points to
the fact that domestic service in Brazil is expected to continue into
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the foreseeable future, at least by the architects who design apartment
buildings for the included.
An illustration of this fact is provided by contemporary
advertisements in Brazilian newspapers, offering middle, and upperclass apartments for rent and sale. Even in São Paulo, which is
considered Brazil’s most modern city, almost all apartments
advertised have rooms for the domestic servant. Most servant rooms
are just big enough for a small bed, not offering ventilation or natural
light. In addition, the invisibility of the domestic worker is furthered
by a strategic design that links the servant’s room to the kitchen and
the washing room, but keeps it distant from rooms where the patrons
socialize. Bigger apartments, for the more affluent, typically have
separate servant entrances, but even smaller, middle-class apartments
find some room for the maid – or at least they include a servant room
into the architectonical plan in order to evoke “upscale living.”
Having a servant is not the exclusive privilege of the elite, but a
widespread practice of included groups. At the same time, living in
an apartment with a servant room evokes privilege and thus serves
the purpose of reproducing inclusion by referencing exclusion, even
if the maid’s quarter remains empty. The fact that even the most
modern apartment buildings in the most modern city of Brazil - São
Paulo - include quarters for the servant points to the modern
character of this institution. Domestic servitude, at least in the eyes
of those architects and developers catering to the included, is an
institution that is here to stay. Yet even if the importance and
magnitude of domestic servitude declines, living in an apartment
with servant quarters bestows important symbolic capital upon those
able to afford it and serves to demarcate the symbolic terrain upon
which disjunctive democracy is constructed.
Conclusion: Normalizing Difference in the Private Sphere

An analysis of the dynamics of the employer-maid relationship as
they are enacted routinely in Brazilian homes leads to several
conclusions. First it points to a continuity of domestication within
Brazilian households. It is no exaggeration to compare the
precariousness of the social condition of a maid to that of a bonded
feudal servant or even to that of a domestic slave. This is especially
the case considering that until 1888 (and sometimes longer) included
Brazilians had domestic slaves (mucamas) to serve them in their
homes.23 The continuity that links domestic slavery to domestic
service contributes to the negative stigma of this activity.24
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Furthermore, the magnitude and economic importance of this work
transforms it into a typical everyday practice, and contributes to the
maintenance of a distinction in Brazilian common sense between
who counts as included and who as excluded. As such, the private
sphere constituted by Brazilian middle and upper class homes must
be seen as constituting one of the main societal places where the
dichotomies of exclusion / inclusion and having rights / depending
on favors are recreated and institutionalized.
With its specific racialized dimension, domestic servitude is also
among the central places where the children of the included learn and
are socialized into the knowledge of how to distinguish and treat
“inferior” people. The systematic infantilization and dehumanization
of Afro-Brazilian adult women in white middle class households
must be seen as a crucial process that perpetuates the
institutionalization and normalization of the “inferiority” of the
racialized other. The docility of the maid, resulting from extreme
patriarchal dependency and precarious status, provides the
counterpart to this dichotomy, resulting in the typical image of the
benevolent black nanny who raises the children of white middle class
parents.
According to some analysts, domestic service keeps growing in
Brazil, indicating that domestic service in Brazil is more than a premodern legacy.25 The modern high-tech apartments for sale offered
in contemporary Brazilian newspapers point to the fact that domestic
service is indeed intimately linked to modernity and capitalist
development in Brazil, allowing one part of human kind to climb up
to the heights of enlightenment on the backs of others that are
condemned to remain in the dark.
The highly routinized institution of domestic servitude in the
households of included Brazilians thus serves as one of the central
societal places to anchor an exclusionary common sense into the
minds of the involved, as well as into the broadly accepted common
sense. Being part of “how things are” does however not necessarily
imply that the excluded readily accept their lot. Although repeated
dehumanization certainly penetrates the lifeworld and value systems
of the excluded, the statements of maids reproduced above also point
to their continued rebellion and moral outrage at the abusive actions
of their employers. Uncritical acceptance is more likely to be found
among the exploiting employers, who seem repeatedly outraged how
“unthankful” their maids are or how “ungrateful” a maid acts when
seeking legal support against her abuse.
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The knowledge of who counts as included and who does not is
reproduced systematically within homes, as it is in schools, as we
saw in Chapter Four. To be effective, however, the institutionalization of inequality produced in the private sphere must reach the
public realm. In the following chapter we will analyze how the
system of social stratification thus created in the private realm spills
over into the public sphere, where it threatens to undermine the
possibility of democratic legitimation.
1

Hall 1979: 325.
Sheriff 1997:215.
Goldstein 2003.
4
Gill 1994: 146f.
5
Chaney and Castro 1989:4.
6
Colen 1989:180f.
7
In Chaney and Castro 1989.
8
See Bales’ definition in Chapter One.
9
Several descriptions of Brazilian slavery are available, such as Antonil,
Andre Joao 1976 [1649]; Freyre, Gilberto 1990a; Gorender, Jacob 1988;
Ramos, Arthur 1934 and 1979; Reis, Joao Jose 1986; Rodrigues, Nina 1988;
Schwartz, Stuart B. 1988; Verger, Pierre 1992, 1981, and 1987; and Viana, Luis
Filho 1988, amongst others. The descriptions these authors provide about
colonial slavery very much resemble the characterizations of contemporary
serfdom in Brazil.
10
Maria Maria, Year 4, No. 4 (2002), available online at
2
3

http://www.undp.org.br/unifem/mariamaria/ano4_n4/sumario4.html
Maria Maria, editorial.
12
Maria Maria, Jurnal published by UNIFEM, no page numbers available.
13
Elvira, 23 years, domestic servant, single, no children, Feira de Santana,
Bahia.
14
Quoted in Berlin 1998: 208.
15
Elvira, 23 years, domestic servant, single, no children, Feira de Santana,
Bahia.
16
Naime, 34 years, social psychologist, no children, São Paulo, SP.
17
Ibid: 220.
18
Ibid: 221.
19
Ibid: 226.
20
Ibid: 251.
21
Ibid: 223.
22
Ibid: 223.
23
Gilberto Freyre has described the special situation of domestic slaves in
his book entitled The Mansions and the Shanties: the making of modern Brazil,
New York: Alfred. A. Knopf (1963). This is the North American edition of the
1936 Brazilian original entitled Sobrados e mucambos: decadência do
patriarcado rural e desenvolvimento do urbano.
24
Kofes 2001:21.
11

The Domestication of the Excluded 85

25
Hildete Pereira de Melo, professor of economy at the Universidade
Federal Fluminense, Maria Maria, year 4, N. 4, 2002.

